When Does a Limited Waiver of the Attorney-Client Privilege Occur? by Hughes, Nancy Mayer
Boston College Law Review
Volume 24
Issue 5 Number 5 Article 3
9-1-1983
When Does a Limited Waiver of the Attorney-
Client Privilege Occur?
Nancy Mayer Hughes
Follow this and additional works at: http://lawdigitalcommons.bc.edu/bclr
Part of the Civil Procedure Commons, and the Evidence Commons
This Notes is brought to you for free and open access by the Law Journals at Digital Commons @ Boston College Law School. It has been accepted for
inclusion in Boston College Law Review by an authorized editor of Digital Commons @ Boston College Law School. For more information, please
contact nick.szydlowski@bc.edu.
Recommended Citation
Nancy M. Hughes, When Does a Limited Waiver of the Attorney-Client Privilege Occur?, 24 B.C.L. Rev. 1283 (1983),
http://lawdigitalcommons.bc.edu/bclr/vol24/iss5/3
WHEN DOES A LIMITED WAIVER
OF THE ATTORNEY-CLIENT PRIVILEGE OCCUR?
Under the common law rules of evidence and procedure, privileges' exist
to protect certain confidential communications from being revealed against the
wishes of the communicator. 2 These privileges operate as an exception to the
general duty, imposed on every individual under the American system of
justice, to give testimony or divulge evidence when requested.' Privileges,
however, are granted only when the public's interest in preserving and protect-
ing a confidential relationship outweighs the general duty to testify. 4 Procedur-
al and evidentiary common law currently recognizes privileges for the commu-
nications between attorney and client,' husband and wife, 6 and physician and
patient.' The theory behind each of these recognized privileges is that secrecy
and confidentiality are necessary to foster the relationship encompassed by the
privilege. 8 The focus for privileged communications, therefore, is upon the
relationship between the parties to whom the privilege has been granted. 9
Before a court accepts an assertion of privilege to protect certain commu-
nications, two issues must be considered. First, the court must decide whether
' The word "privilege" is used in this article to mean privileged communications,
defined as those statements made by certain persons within a protected relationship, which the
law protects from forced disclosure. BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 1078 (rev. 5th ed. 1979).
Privileges may also be established by statute. For example, the great majority of
states provide a statutory privilege for the communications between priest and penitent. A com-
pilation of such statutes can be found in 8 J. WIGMORE, EVIDENCE IN TRIALS OF COMMON LAW
5 2395, at 873-77 (J. McNaughton rev. 1961 & Supp. 1982) [hereinafter cited as WIGMORE].
Some states have enacted statutes creating a privilege for communications to, inter alia, account-
ants and psychologists. Id. 5 2286, at 533. In addition, a privilege against self-incrimination is
identified in the federal and most state constitutions. See U.S. CONST. amend. V; see also
WIGMORE, supra, § 2252, at 319 (privilege against self-incrimination included in constitutions of
all but two states).
3
 WIGMORE, supra, note 2, 5 2192, at 70 ("	 [T]here is a general duty to give what
testimony one is capable of giving.... "); Id. 5 2285, at 527.
4
 Dean Wigmore has stated four fundamental conditions necessary to establish a privi-
lege, which emphasize the interest in protecting a confidential relationship:
(1) The communications must originate in a confidence that they will not be
disclosed.
(2) This element of confidentiality must be essential to the full and satisfactory
maintenance of the relation between the parties.
(3) The relation must be one which in the opinion of the community ought to be
sedulously fostered.
(4) The injury that would inure to the relation by the disclosure of the com-
munications must be greater than the benefit thereby gained for the correct disposal
of the litigation.
Id. 5 2285, at 527.
5 See id. 55 2290-2329.
6 See id. 55 2332-2341.
See id. 55 2380-2391.
In re Penn Central Commercial Paper Litig., 61 F.R.D. 453, 463-64 (S.D.N.Y.
1973).
9 MCCORMICK, HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF EVIDENCE 5 72, at 152 (2d ed. 1972)
[hereinafter cited as MCCORMICK].
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the communications for which privilege is being asserted are, in fact, privi-
leged." To be considered privileged, the communications must meet an initial
requirement that they are confidential — that they were not made in the
presence of a third party." The communications must also meet the particular
requirements for the type of privilege being asserted. For example, a husband
and wife must have been married at the time of the communication for the
marital privilege to be asserted.' 2 Second, if the communications are privi-
leged, the court must consider whether the privilege has been waived in some
manner." Disclosure of the confidential communications by the holder of the
privilege, or with his consent, may cause the privilege to be waived." If the
privilege has been waived, the communications are no longer protected from
discovery or from being introduced into evidence.
Waiver of the attorney-client privilege generally is held to occur whenever
some disclosure of the confidential communications is made by the client, or
with his consent. 15 The common law, however, recognizes certain situations in
which disclosure is made, but either no waiver is deemed to occur, or the
waiver is deemed limited to the precise subject matter of the information dis-
closed." In recent years, a few courts have suggested a third limitation on
waiver of the attorney-client privilege. Under this limitation, certain disclo-
sures of the client's confidential communications are deemed to waive the
privilege only with respect to the recipient of that communication." This addi-
tional limitation, which has been applied only to disclosures made by a cor-
porate client," would preclude all non-recipient third parties from asserting
waiver of the attorney-client privilege for the information previously
disclosed." This "recipient limitation" to the waiver of the attorney-client
privilege has sparked debate among the courts. 2° Currently, a split exists
10 See WIGMORE, supra note 2, 5 2286, at 527-28.
" Id.	 2311, at 599, 601.
' 2 MCCORMICK, supra note 9, 5 81, at 167. For the elements necessary to a claim of
attorney-client privilege, see infra notes 44-49 and accompanying text.
" See, e.g., Diversified Indus., Inc. v. Meredith, 572 F.2d 596, 611 (8th Cir. 1978) (en
banc), in which the court, after concluding that confidential communications were entitled to the
attorney-client privilege, then considered the issue of whether the privilege had been waived. In
addition, in the description of the elements of the attorney-client privilege by Wigmore, see infra
note 45, the first seven elements go to a determination of whether the communication is privi-
leged, while the final element considers whether that privilege has been waived.
" See infra notes 73-95 and accompanying text.
" MCCORMICK, supra note 9, 5 93, at 194.
16 See infra notes 96-118 and accompanying text.
See Diversified Indus., Inc. v. Meredith, 572 F.2d 596 (8th Cir. 1978) (en banc);
Byrnes v. IDS Realty Trust Co., 85 F.R.D. 679 (S.D.N.Y. 1980).
" See Diversified Indus., Inc. v. Meredith, 572 F.2d 596 (8th Cir. 1978) (en banc);
Byrnes v. IDS Realty Trust, 85 F.R.D. 679 (S.D.N.Y. 1980); In re Grand jury Subpoena Dated
July 13, 1979, 478 F. Supp. 368 (E.D. Wis. 1979).
" See Diversified Indus., Inc. v. Meredith, 572 F.2d 596 (8th Cir. 1978) (en bane).
2° See infra notes 124-68 and accompanying text.
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among the federal circuit courts over the use of such a recipient-limited waiver
for corporate clients. 2 '
This note will focus upon waiver of the attorney-client privilege, and
specifically, when that waiver may be limited. The note considers whether
waiver should be limited in situations in which a corporate client has disclosed
confidential information to a government agency. The note begins with a
review of the attorney-client privilege. 22 Next, it defines waiver and describes
the traditional rule for waiver. 23 The note then discusses situations under the
common law in which the scope of waiver may be limited with respect to the
subject matter disclosed. 24 The new concept of recipient-limited waiver by cor-
porate clients, introduced in Diversified Industries, Inc. v. Meredith, 25 is presented,
followed by a discussion of subsequent cases elaborating upon that holding. 26
Cases from other circuits which have opposed such a concept of recipient-
limited waiver are then presented, 27 along with a modified approach suggested
by one district court. 28 In the final section, the note analyzes the reasons for re-
jecting this new rule of limited waiver. 29
 The note concludes that the concept of
a recipient-limited waiver of the attorney-client privilege, solely for use by cor-
porate clients, should not be adopted.
I. THE ATTORNEY-CLIENT PRIVILEGE
The attorney-client privilege is the oldest known privilege for confidential
communications." Originally, the privilege was designed to protect the attor-
ney, who was upon his oath and honor to keep the secrets of this clients. 31
Because the privilege protected the attorney, he was permitted to waive it. 32 By
the late Eighteenth Century, however, the focus of the privilege had shifted to
the protection of the client." Under the modern rule, therefore, it is the client's
prerogative to assert' 4
 or waive the privilege."
" Compare Diversified Indus., Inc. v. Meredith, 572 F.2d 596 (8th Cir. 1978) (en bane)
(holding waiver by corporate client limited to recipient of privileged information) with Permian
Corp. v. Untied States, 665 F.2d 1214 (D.C. Cir. 1981) (rejecting concept of recipient-limited
waiver).
22 See infra notes 30-72 and accompanying text.
" See infra notes 73-95 and accompanying text.
24 See infra notes 96-118 and accompanying text.
" 572 F.2d 596 (8th Cir. 1978) (en bane).
26 See infra notes 119-49 and accompanying text.
27 See infra notes 150-68 and accompanying text.
28 See infra notes 169-80 and accompanying text.
29 See infra notes 182-249 and accompanying text.
3° WIGMORE, supra note 2, 2290, at 542. See also Gergacz, Attorney-Corporate Client Priv-
ilege, 37 BUS. LAW. 461, 473-74 (1982), for a discussion of historical antecedents of the attorney-
client privilege.
31 WIGMORE, supra note 2, 5 2290, at 543.
" Id, at 545.
33 Id, 55 2290, 2291.
" In re Grand Jury Investig. of Ocean Transp., 604 F.2d 672, 675 (D.C. Cir. 1979);
MCCORMICK, supra note 9, 5 92, at 192.
WIGMORE, supra note 2, 5 2327, at 635; MCCORmIcK, supra note 9, 5 93, at 194; see,
1286	 BOSTON COLLEGE LAW REVIEW	 [Vol. 24:1283
The privilege nevertheless benefits both the attorney and the client." The
purpose of the privilege is to encourage full and free communication between
attorneys and their clients," by providing for the client's freedom from ap-
prehension when consulting with his attorney about sensitive matters. 3° Clients
may speak more freely if they know that the confidentiality of their com-
munications is protected, and that the information cannot be used against them
without their consent. At the same time, the privilege recognizes that sound
legal advice depends upon the lawyer being fully informed by the client." The
attorney, therefore, will be benefitted when the client feels free to make a full
disclosure of all the facts to him.
The attorney-client privilege may be invoked in several different contexts
to protect confidential communications. Originally, the attorney-client privi-
lege developed as a testimonial privilege, applicable only to judicial and admin-
istrative proceedings.° The privilege has since developed into a broader evi-
dentiary rule. In addition to protecting testimony, this rule also prohibits intro-
ducing into evidence any statements or documents protected by privilege.'"
Moreover, the privilege may be invoked at the discovery stage, to prevent dis-
covery of privileged materia1. 42 In addition, an even broader duty of non-dis-
closure, not limited merely to discovery and trial contexts, is imposed upon the
attorney-client relationship by the attorney's professional ethical considera-
tions. 43
e.g., Schnell v. Schnall, 550 F. Stipp. 650, 653 (S.D.N.Y. 1982) (because privilege belongs to
client, corporation did not waive privilege by mere fact that attorney testified before Securities
and Exchange Commission).
36 Gergacz, supra note 30, at 462-72. The general public has been identified as a third
beneficiary of the attorney-client privilege. Id.
37 Upjohn Co. v. United States, 449 U.S. 383, 389 (1981); Fisher v. United States, 425
U.S. 391, 403 (1976); WIGMORE, supra note 2, 2306, at 590.
38 WIGMORE, supra note 2, 5 2290, at 543; Id. 5 2291, at 545.
" See Trammel v. United States, 445 U.S. 40, 51 (1980).
4° Rosenfeld, The Transformation of the Attorney-Client Privilege: In Search of an Ideological
Reconciliation of Individualism, the Adversary System, and the Corporate Client's SEC Disclosure Obligations,
33 HASTINGS L.J.495, 495-96 (1982). At the time the attorney-client privilege developed, the
testimony of witnesses was the common source of proof in jury trials. WIGMORE, supra note 2,
5 2290, at 542-43. There was no provision for discovery prior to trial. Id.
" See generally WIGMORE, supra note 2, §S 2306-2310.
" E.g., FED. R. Civ. P. 26(b)(1) states that parties generally may obtain discovery re-
garding any relevant -matter which is not privileged.
4' See Burke, The Duty of Confidentiality and Disclosing Corporate Misconduct, 36 Bus. LAW.
239, 241, 244-45 (1981). The ethical obligations in the attorney-client relationship are broader
than the evidentiary privilege for three reasons. First, under the ethical obligations, any informa-
tion from the client will be protected, not just that obtained in the context of legal advice. Id. at
244. Second, confidentiality will not be waived despite the presence of a third person. Id. Finally,
information from sources other than the client will also be protected. Id. See also MODEL CODE OF
PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY EC 4-4 (1979), which states that the attorney-client privilege is
more limited than the ethical obligation of a lawyer.
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The essential elements for a finding of attorney-client privilege have been
stated in definitions by courts" and commentators." One element emphasized
in all definitions is that the attorney-client relationship must be clearly estab-
lished. The person making the communication, therefore, must be a client in
order to claim the privilege." In addition, the communication must be made to
an attorney, acting in his legal capacity, 47 or to his subordinate." Finally, the
privilege exists only if it has not been waived."
Judicial interpretations have further delineated the characteristics of the
attorney-client privilege. First, courts have determined that the privilege pro-
tects both the communications made by the client to the attorney and by the at-
torney to the client." In addition, courts have allowed communications be-
tween the client and someone acting as an agent for the attorney to be pro-
tected.'[ For the privilege to attach to any communications, however, those
communications must be made for the purpose of securing legal advice." The
** The description by Judge Wyzanski in United States v. United Shoe Machinery
Corp., 89 F. Supp. 357, 358-59 (D. Mass. 1950), is frequently cited as the definition of the essen-
tial elements for a finding of attorney-client privilege:
The privilege applies only if (1) the asserted holder of the privilege is or sought to
become a client; (2) the person to whom the communication was made (a) is a mem-
ber of the bar of a court, or his subordinate and (b) in connection with this com-
munication is acting as a lawyer; (3) the communication relates to a fact of which the
attorney was informed (a) by his client (b) without the presence of strangers (c) for
the purpose of securing primarily either (i) an opinion on law or (ii) legal services or
(iii) assistance in some legal proceeding, and not (d) for the purpose of committing a
crime or tort; and (4) the privilege has been (a) claimed arid (b) not waived by the
client.
Id,
" The essential elements necessary for a finding of attorney-client privilege have been
stated in the definition by Dean Wigmore:
(1) Where legal advice of any kind is sought (2) from a professional legal advisor
in his capacity as such, (3) the communications relating to that purpose, (4) made in
confidence (5) by the client, (6) are at his instance permanently protected (7) from
disclosure by himself or by the legal advisor, (8) except the protection be waived.
WIGMORE, supra note 2, 5 2292, at 554.
46 See supra notes 44-45. See also WIGMORE, supra note 2, 5 2317, at 618-19.
" See supra notes 44-45. See also WIGMORE, supra note 2, 5 2300, at 580-81; Id. S 2303, at
584.
" See supra note 44. See also WIGMORE, supra note 2, 5 2301, at 583.
42 See supra notes 44-45.
5° Natta v. Hogan, 392 F.2d 686, 692-93 (10th Cir. 1968); Schwimmer v. United
States, 232 F.2d 855, 863 (8th Cir. 1956); see also WIGMORE, supra note 2, 55 2292, 2320, at 628-
29; MCCORMICK, supra note 9, 5 89, at 182-83.
5 ' United States v. Kovel, 296 F.2d 918, 920-21 (2d Cir. 1961) (complexities of modern
existence require that attorneys frequently need assistance of others, who are not attorneys, such
as secretaries and clerks); Burlington Indus. v. Exxon Corp., 65 F.R.D. 26, 40 (D. Md. 1974)
(attorney-client privilege extends to agents or subordinates of attorney, but they must be those
persons essential to lawyer's performance of legal services); see also WIGMORE, supra note 2,
5 2301, at 583.
52 See, e.g., United States v. Davis, 636 F.2d 1028, 1043 (5th Cir. 1981) (communica-
tions with attorney in preparing client's tax returns not privileged because not in nature of legal
advice); Diversified Indus., Inc. v. Meredith, 572 F.2d 596, 610 (8th Cir. 1978) (en banc)
1288	 BOSTON COLLEGE LAW REVIEW	 [Vol. 21:1283
privilege does not extend to business advice given by an attorney." Further-
more, a client cannot protect pre-existing documents which have no claim of
privilege, from disclosure simply by transferring them to an attorney. 54 Final-
ly, the privilege will be denied for any communication which is prompted by
the desire to commit a crime or fraud."
It is now well established by the courts that the attorney-client privilege
can be asserted by a corporation. 56 Problems arise in applying the attorney-
client privilege to a corporate client, however, because as an abstract legal enti-
ty, a corporation can only act through its agents and employees. 57 In recent
years, many cases dealing with attorney-client privilege in the corporate con-
text have focused upon which employees could assert the privilege on the cor-
(stating that court must first determine whether communications were made to secure legal ad-
vice).
" Georgia-Pacific Plywood Co. v. United States Plywood Corp., 18 F.R.D. 463, 464
(S.D.N.Y. 1956); Zenith Radio Corp. v. Radio Corp. of America, 121 F. Supp. 792, 794 (D.
Del. 1954); see also Underwater Storage, Inc. v. United States Rubber Co., 314 F. Supp, 546,
548 (D.D.C. 1970) (communications dealing with patent activities not privileged because they
can as easily be handled by non-lawyers). Similarly, there is no provision for a confidential
accountant-client privilege under federal law. Couch v. United States, 409 U.S. 322, 335 (1973).
5+ In Fisher v. United States, 425 U.S, 391 (1976), taxpayers received from their ac-
countants documents used in the preparation of their tax returns. Id. at 394. The taxpayers then
transferred those documents to their attorneys for legal assistance in connection with an in-
vestigation by the Internal Revenue Service. Id. When the IRS sought to obtain these
documents, the attorneys refused to comply with the summons. Id. at 395. The United States
Supreme Court, however, ordered production of the documents, even though they had been
given to the attorneys for the purpose of securing legal advice. Id. at 414. The Court explained
that pre-existing documents, which if in the bands of the client would not be subject to court proc-
ess, would thus be protected from disclosure when placed in the hands of the attorney. Id. at 404.
The Court found that the summons to produce the documents did not involve the taxpayers' fifth
amendment privilege against self-incrimination. Id. at 414. Since the documents in question had
no privilege in the hands of the client, they could not be protected by the attorney-client privilege
simply by virtue of their transfer to the attorney. Id. at 409.
Fisher has been interpreted as establishing two conditions for the attorney-client privilege
to protect pre-existing documents transferred to an attorney. United States v. Davis, 636 F.2d
1028, 1040 (5th Cir. 1981). First, the information in the documents must be confidential and the
transfer to the attorney must be made for the purpose of securing legal advice. Id. Second, the
documents must have been privileged in the client's hands before the transfer. Id.
55 See WIGMORE, supra note 2, 2298, at 572 ("[T]he privilege cannot avail to protect
the client in concerting with the attorney a crime or other evil enterprise"); see also Clark v.
United States, 289 U.S. 1, 15 (1933) (fraud); United States v. Calvert, 523 F.2d 895, 909 (8th
Cir. 1975), cert. denied, 424 U.S. 911 (1976) (at common law, confidential communications from
client to attorney are not privileged if made for purposes of obtaining aid in commission of future
criminal acts); United States v. Friedman, 445 F.2d 1076, 1085 (9th Cir. 1971) ("confidential
attorney-client communications lose their privileged character when they concern contemplated
unlawful acts by the client").
56 Radiant Burners, Inc. v. American Gas Ass'n, 320 F.2d 314, 323 (7th Cir. 1963); see
Upjohn Co. v. United States, 449 U.S. 383, 389-90 (1981) (Supreme Court assumed that
privilege also applied when client was a corporation).
" See, e.g., Upjohn Co. v. United States, 449 U.S. 383, 389-90 (1981) ("Admittedly
complications in the application of the privilege arise when the client is a corporation, which in
theory is an artificial creature of the law, and not an individual .... ").
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poration's behalf. 58 In Upjohn Co. v. United States, 59 the Supreme Court of the
United States declined to lay down a broad rule to analyze the scope of
attorney-client privilege in the corporate context, preferring instead a case-by-
case determination. 6°
Finally, great emphasis is placed upon the requirement that the communi-
cations between attorney and client be made and maintained in confidence for
privilege to attach. 6 ' There is no privilege if the communication between client
and attorney is made in the presence of a third party, 62 because that contradicts
the purpose of the privilege — to protect confidentiality. Similarly, no privilege
may be asserted for a communication which the client intends to have the attor-
ney impart to others."
" Various tests were developed by the courts for determining which employees' com-
munications to corporate counsel would be protected by attorney-client privilege. The first test to
be formulated was the "control group" test. City of Philadelphia v. Westinghouse Elec. Corp.,
210 F. Supp. 483 (E.D. Pa.), mandamus and prohibition denied sub. nom., General Elec. Co. v,
Kirkpatrick, 312 F.2d 743 (3d Cir. 1962), cert. denied, 372 U.S. 943 (1963). This test required, for
a communication to be privileged, that the employee making the communication be in a position
to control, or take a substantial part in, the decision about any action to be taken by the corpora-
tion on the advice of the attorney. Id. at 485.
The "control group" test was subsequently rejected in Harper & Row Publishers, Inc.
v. Decker, 423 F.2d 487 (7th Cir. 1970), aff'd per curiam by an equally divided Court, 400 U.S. 348
(1971), in favor of a "subject matter" test. Under this analysis, an employee of a corporation —
even though not within its control group — could claim attorney-client privilege when the
employee made the communication at the direction of his supervisors, and the subject matter of
the communication involved the performance of the employee's duties. Id. at 491-92.
A "modified subject matter" test then was presented in Diversified Indus., Inc. v.
Meredith, 572 F.2d 596, 609 (8th Cir. 1978) (en bane). The court specified five factors that must
exist for the attorney-client privilege to be applicable to an employee's communications with the
attorney. Id. at 610-11. First, the communication must be made for the purpose of securing legal
advice; second, the employee must have made the communication at the direction of his cor-
porate superior; third, the superior must have made the request so that the corporation could
secure legal advice; fourth, the subject matter of the communication must be within the scope of
the employee's duties; and finally, the communication must not be disseminated beyond those
persons who because of the corporate structure need to know its contents. Id.
For a description and analysis of the three main tests, see ,generally, Comment, The Cor-
porate Attorney-Client Privilege: The Subject Matter Test v. The Control Group Test: Will Reasonableness
Prevail? — United States v. Upjohn, 5 DEL. J. CORP. L. 480, 484-91 (1980); Note, Application of the
Attorney-Client Privilege to Corporations: New Directions and a Proposed Solution, 20 B.C. L. REV. 953
(1979); Note, Corporate Attorney-Client Privilege — Diversified Industries, Inc. v. Meredith — The Modi-
fied Harper & Row Test, 41 CORP. LAW 226 (1978).
59
 449 U.S. 383 (1981).
" Id. at 386.
" United States v. Tellier, 255 F.2d 441, 447 (2d Cir. 1958). See WIGMORE, supra note
2, 5 2311, at 599; MCCORMICK, supra note 9, $ 91, at 187.
62 See, e.g., United States v. Blackburn, 446 F.2d 1089, 1091 (5th Cir. 1971); cert. denied,
404 U.S. 1017 (1972); Burlington Indus. v. Exxon Corp., 65 F.R.D. 26, 37 (D. Md. 1974);
WIGMORE, supra note 2, 5 2311, at 601.
63 See, e.g., United States v. Tellier, 255 F.2d 441, 447 (2d Cir. 1958) (attorney's advice
to client held not privilged because client expected attorney to prepare letter to third party setting
forth attorney's objections); see also MCCORMICK, supra note 9, 91, at 188.
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The use of the attorney-client privilege, however, presents a conflict be-
tween the desire, on one hand, to protect confidential communications, and the
desire on the other hand, to achieve truth in our system of justice." The con-
flict is inherent in any privilege, because assertion of a privilege allows certain
information to be withheld from the adversarial process." Since the privilege is
an exception to the general duty to testify and to disclose relevant evidence, 66
there is a notion of unfairness in the assertion of privilege; despite its benefits,
the privilege stands as an obstacle to the investigation of truth. 67 Due to this
conflict between confidentiality and truth inherent in the use of privileges, the
scope of the attorney-client privilege is narrowly construed." The privilege,
therefore, will be applied only when necessary to achieve its purpose of protect-
ing the confidential relationship between the attorney and client." Further-
more, the attorney-client privilege is to be construed narrowly because it pro-
tects materials which would otherwise be discoverable, and thus limits the op-
posing party's access to evidence." Many courts speak of a need for a balanc-
ing approach, so that the interest in preserving the purpose of the privilege is
balanced with the need for disclosure of all relevant information." A slightly
different view refers to a tension reflected in the attorney-client privilege be-
tween the rights of the individual and the good of society. 72 A narrow construc-
tion of the scope of the attorney-client privilege thus achieves a balance be-
tween those competing interests.
In summary, therefore, the attorney-client privilege exists to protect the
confidential relationship between attorney and client. The purpose of the
privilege is to encourage frank and full communications between the attorney
64 See, e.g., United States v. Nixon, 418 U.S. 683, 709-10 (1974) (privileges against
forced disclosure, established in the Constitution, by statute, or at common law, are " ... excep-
tions to the demand for every man's evidence [and] are not lightly created nor expansively con-
strued, for they are in derogation of the search for truth").
65 For example, FED. R. Civ, P. 26-37 grant broad discovery procedures, yet privileged
material is immune from discovery under FED. R. Civ. P. 26(b)(1). See Hickman v. Taylor, 329
U.S. 495, 507-08 (1947) (discovery rules are to be accorded a broad and liberal treatment, but
there will still be a limitation upon discovery when it encroaches upon private areas).
66 See supra note 3 and accompanying text. See also In re John Doe Corp., 675 F.2d 482,
489 (2d Cir. 1982) ("The privilege itself is an exception to the critically important duty of citizens
to disclose relevant evidence in legal proceedings.").
WIGMORE, supra note 2, § 2291, at 554.
68 See Underwater Storage, Inc. v. United States Rubber Co., 314 F. Supp. 546,
547-48 (D.D.C. 1970); WIGMORE, supra note 2, § 2291, at 554.
" Fisher v. United States, 425 U.S. 391, 403 (1976).
" See In re Horowitz, 482 F.2d 72, 81 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 414 U.S. 867 (1973). Cf.
WIGMORE, supra note 2, § 2192, at 70 ("fundamental maxim that the public ... has a right to
every man's evidence").
7 ' See, e.g, In re Ampicillin Antitrust Litig., 81 F.R.D. 377, 384 (D.D.C. 1978) (court's
duty is to achieve "a balance between the need for disclosure of all relevant information and the
need to encourage free and open discussion by clients in the course of legal representation"); In-
ternational Business Mach. Corp. v. Sperry Rand Corp., 44 F.R.D. 10, 13 n.2 (D. Del. 1968).
" See Rosenfeld, supra note 40, at 496-99, for a discussion of the tensions inherent in the
attorney-client privilege, relating to a theory of individualism.
September 1983]	 ATTORNEY-CLIENT PRIVILEGE	 1291
and the client. The privilege, however, is to be narrowly construed in keeping
with this purpose. One restriction upon the attorney-client privilege, which
helps keep it narrowly construed, is that the privilege can be lost through
waiver. This note next considers the doctrine of waiver, and the way in which it
operates upon the attorney-client privilege.
II. WAIVER
A. Waiver Defined
"Waiver" is the intentional relinquishment or abandonment of a known
right or privilege." The traditional rule on waiver is one of strict construction,"
so that any disclosure of confidential communications to a third party waives
privilege for those communications." The effect of waiver is that the com-
munications which have been disclosed may no longer be barred from produc-
tion," or from admission at trial," on the grounds of privilege. Once waiver
has occurred, therefore, the former holder of the privilege may no longer assert
that privilege to avoid answering questions or producing documents."
For waiver to occur, the information which is disclosed must be privi-
leged. Production of material to which no privilege could attach does not waive
" Johnson v. Zerbst, 304 U.S. 458, 464 (1938).
" In determining an issue of waiver, the courts frequently make a distinction between
claims of protection based on attorney-client privilege and those based on the work product doc-
trine. The courts are often willing to consider a more liberal standard for waiver of work product,
because of the different purpose of each privilege. See, e.g., Permian Corp. v. United States, 665
F.2d 1214, 1219 (D.C. Cir. 1981) (question of waiver depended upon nature of privilege
asserted). While the purpose in granting the attorney-client privilege is to protect the confiden-
tiality of communications and to protect the attorney-client relationship, the purpose of the work
product doctrine is to protect the material soley from the opposing party, rather than to prevent
the outside world generally from obtaining the information. See United States v. American Tel. &
Tel. Co., 642 F.2d 1285, 1299 (D.C. Cir. 1980). The work product privilege thus protects the at-
torney. Id.; see also GAF Corp. v. Eastman Kodak Co., 85 F.R.D. 46, 52 (S.D.N.Y. 1979).
The majority rule for waiver of the work product privilege, therefore, is that disclosure of
work product information to a third party does not constitute waiver of that privilege, unless the
disclosure substantially increases the possibility that the opposing party could obtain the informa-
tion. GAF Corp. v. Eastman Kodak Co., 85 F.R.D. at 51-52.
75 In re Horowitz, 482 F.2d 72, 81 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 414 U.S. 867 (1973); In re Penn
Central Commercial Paper Litig., 61 F.R.D. 453, 463 (S.D. N. Y. 1973); see also MCCORMICK ,
supra note 9, 93.
76 See, e.g., In re Horowitz, 482 F.2d 72 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 414 U.S. 867 (1973) (court
refusing to quash a subpoena duces tecum requiring accountant to produce documents which had lost
their confidentiality); Eglin Federal Credit Union v. Cantor, Fitzgerald Securities, Inc., 91
F.R.D. 414, 419 (N.D. Ga. 1981) (motion to compel production granted with respect to
documents for which attorney-client privilege had been waived).
" See, e.g., United States v. Pauldino, 487 F.2d 127, 130 (10th Cir. 1973), cert. denied,
415 U.S. 981 (1974).
78 See, e.g., In re Weiss, 596 F.2d 1185 (4th Cir. 1979); In re Horowitz, 482 F.2d 72 (2d
Cir.), cert. denied, 414 U.S. 867 (1973); W.R. Grace & Co. v. Pullman, Inc., 446 F. Supp. 771,
775 (W.D. Okla. 1976).
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privilege with respect to other, protected communications." In addition, privi-
lege cannot be waived by failure to assert it, absent any disclosure. 8° Further-
more, the mere action of bringing or defending a lawsuit cannot waive privi-
lege." Waiver occurs only when privileged material is disclosed, without any
assertion of privilege."
Another characteristic of waiver is that the disclosure must be voluntary. 83
There is no waiver of the attorney-client privilege if disclosure is compelled by
a court order." Courts have disagreed, however, as to whether an intention to
waive privilege is necessary for waiver to occur." A person would never intend
to waive, if intention alone could control the privilege. 86
 Waiver may be im-
plied by some courts, however, from the conduct of a party, even when waiver
is not express or intentional." For example, an implied waiver of the attorney-
client privilege has been found when the attorney and client become adverse
parties in a lawsuit arising out of their relationship. 88
" International Business Mach. Corp. v. Sperry Rand Corp., 44 F.R.D. 10, 13 (D.
Del. 1968); see United States v. Aronoff, 466 F. Supp, 855, 860 (S.D.N.Y. 1979) (failure to ob-
ject to lawyer's disclosure of unprivileged information did not waive privilege).
" United States v. Jacobs, 322 F. Supp. 1299, 1303 (C.D. Cal. 1971).
81
 4 J. MOORE & J. LUCAS, MOORE'S FEDERAL PRACTICE 126.60(6) (2d ed. 1982)
("Some [privileges], such as the attorney-client privilege, could not normally be held to be waived
by bringing or defending suit, for in the attorney-client situation the privilege is designed to pro-
mote confidential relations that may well deal with the very suit in question.").
82 United States v. Jacobs, 322 F. Supp. 1299, 1303 (C.D. Cal. 1971).
" Transamerica Computer Co. v. International Business Mach. Corp., 573 F.2d 646,
651 (9th Cir. 1978); see Duplan Corp. v. Deering Milliken, Inc., 397 F. Supp. 1146, 1161
(D.S.C. 1974); FED. R. EVID. 511 (Proposed Draft 1973) (privilege waived if holder of privilege
"voluntarily discloses or consents to disclosure of any significant part of the matter or communi-
cation").
84 E.g. , Transamerica Computer Co. v. International Business Mach. Corp., 573 F.2d
646, 651 (9th Cir. 1978) (court held that IBM had not waived its attorney-client privilege through
an inadvertant production of privileged documents during a court-ordered accelerated discovery
period).
85 Compare International Business Mach. Corp. v. Sperry Rand Corp., 44 F.R.D. 10,
13 (D. Del. 1968) (waiver must be clear and intentional) with In re Grand Jury Investig. of Ocean
Transp., 604 F.2d 672, 675 (D.C. Cir. 1979) (intent to waive one's privilege not necessary for
waiver to occur) and Champion Int'l Corp. v. International Paper Co., 486 F. Supp. 1328, 1332
(N.D. Ga. 1980) (intent to waive attorney-client privilege not necessary for waiver).
s supra note 2, 5 2327, at 636 ("A privileged person would seldom be
found to waive, if his intention not to abandon could alone control the situation.").
" See, e.g., Permian Corp. v. United States, 665 F.2d 1214, 1219-20 & n.11 (D.C. Cir.
1981). In Permian, the corporation inadvertantly released privileged documents to the target cor-
poration of their exchange offer during discovery. When the corporation subsequently allowed
the SEC to have access to those documents through the target corporation, with no assertion of
privilege, the court held that the attorney-client privilege had been waived. See also In re Grand
Jury Investig. of Ocean Transp., 604 F.2d 672, 674-75 (D.C. Cir. 1979) (inadvertant disclosure
constituted effective waiver of privilege); Hearn v. Rhay, 68 F.R.D. 574, 580-81 (E.D. Wash.
1975) (discussing elements of an implied waiver of attorney-client privilege).
88
 Pruitt v. Peyton, 243 F. Supp. 907, 909 (E.D. Va. 1965); MCCORMICK, supra note
9, 5 91, at 191; WIGMORE, supra note 2, 5 2327, at 638.
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The rationale behind the traditional rule regarding waiver is that privilege
exists to protect confidentiality." Any violation of the confidentiality therefore
destroys the purpose of the privilege because there is no longer any need for
protection of the confidential communications. 9° The disclosure of information
by the holder of the privilege is viewed as inconsistent with the confidential
relationship, and thus waiver of privilege is held to occur." A further reason
for the strict rule of waiver deals with the fairness required in an adversarial
system. 92 Privilege operates to preclude the admission of certain information
into the adversarial process." If a party were allowed to disclose some informa-
tion, and yet withhold the remainder, that could be misleading to the opposing
party." The traditional rule, holding that complete waiver occurs once some
disclosure is made, seeks to guard against such unfairness. 95
B. Limitations on Waiver of the Attorney-Client Privilege
1. Limits Under the Common Law
Under a strict construction of the waiver doctrine, any disclosure of confi-
dential communications is equivalent to a waiver of privilege. 96 Despite this
traditional rule on waiver," the common law recognizes certain circumstances
when the scope of waiver of the attorney-client privilege may be limited. In-
deed, any one of three results may follow a disclosure of privileged informa-
tion. First, the disclosure may trigger a complete waiver of the attorney-client
privilege — the result decreed by the traditional rule of waiver." Second, a dis-
closure may be made, and some waiver of privilege may be deemed to occur,
but that waiver is limited to the specific subject matter disclosed. 99 Finally, a
disclosure may be made, but no waiver of the attorney-client privilege may be
89
 In re Penn Central Commercial Paper Litig., 61 F.R.D. 453, 464 (S.D.N.Y. 1973);
see WIGMORE, supra note 2, 2311, at 599.
9° See Underwater Storage, Inc. v. United States Rubber Co., 314 F. Supp. 546,
548.49 (D.D.C. 1970) (once confidentiality is breached, basis for continued existence of privilege
is destroyed); United States v. Kelsey-Hayes Wheel Co., 15 F.R.D. 461, 464-65 (E.D. Mich.
1954) (privilege deemed waived when policy behind privilege can no longer be served).
91 United States v. American Tel. & Tel. Co., 642 F.2d 1285, 1299 (D.C. Cir. 1980).
92 Handgards, Inc. v. Johnson & Johnson, 413 F. Supp. 926, 929 (N.D. Cal. 1976)
(important consideration in assessing issue of waiver is fairness); Lee Nat'l Corp. v. Deramus,
313 F. Supp. 224, 227 (D. Del. 1970) (patently unfair for client to disclose in some instances and
withhold in others); see WIGMORE, supra note 2, 5 2327, at 636.
" See supra notes 41-42 and accompanying text.
9# United States v. Aronoff, 466 F. Supp. 855, 862 (S. D.N.Y. 1979) (assertions about
privileged communications without full disclosure may be false or misleading); see WIGMORE,
supra note 2, 5 2327, at 636.
95
 WIGMORE, supra note 2, 5 2327, at 636.
96 See supra notes 74-78 and accompanying text.
97 See supra notes 74-75 and accompanying text.
98 See, e.g., Permian Corp. v. United States, 665 F.2d 1214 (D.C. Cir. 1981); In re Penn
Central Commercial Paper Litig., 61 F.R.D. 453•(S.D.N.Y. 1973).
99 See infra notes 101-14 and accompanying text.
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found to have occurred.'" This section will discuss the circumstances under
which the courts may follow the second and third results and not find a com-
plete waiver of the attorney-client privilege, despite the fact that some
disclosure of confidential communications has been made.
a. Limited to Subject Matter
A disclosure which normally would waive the attorney-client privilege
may nevertheless result in a waiver limited to the subject matter of the disclo-
sure.'°' Under this doctrine of subject matter-limited waiver, disclosure of a
particular communication will constitute a waiver only with respect to the sub-
ject matter of that communication. Thus, for example, testimony by an attor-
ney or client concerning a specific communication will be a waiver only as to all
other communications on that same subject.'° 2 The waiver of the privilege is
limited, since it does not compel disclosure of all the communications that oc-
curred between the attorney and client, but only those communications which
dealt with the subject matter revealed by the disclosure.'°' Communications
between the attorney and client on other subject matters, therefore, will remain
privileged.
Similarly, waiver of the attorney-client privilege may be limited to subject
matter when only part of a privileged communication is disclosed. For exam-
ple, in R.J. Herely & Son Co. v. Stotler & Co.,'" the defendant brought a motion
to compel production of a memorandum, from which the plaintiff's attorney
had read portions aloud at a settlement meeting.'" The court held that the
voluntary disclosure of a portion of a privileged communication constituted a
waiver with respect to the rest of the communication on the same subject. 1 °6
Nevertheless, other confidential communications between the attorney and
client, on other subjects, have not been waived by the partial disclosure, and
thus retain their claims of privilege.
The reasoning behind the common law recognition of a limited waiver
when either the subject matter or the partial contents of a communication are
"° See, e.g., Sylgab Steel & Wire Corp. v. Imoco-Gateway Corp., 62 F.R.D. 454 (N.D.
111. 1974), aff'd, 534 F.2d 330 (7th Cir. 1976); American Optical Corp. v. Medtronic, Inc., 56
F.R.D. 426 (D. Mass. 1972).
10 ' See, e.g., Well v. Investment/Indicators, Research & Management, Inc., 647 F.2d 18
(9th Cir. 1981); Goldman, Sachs & Co. v. Blondis, 412 F. Supp. 286 (N.D. III. 1976).
105
 WIGMORE, supra note 2, § 2327, at 638.
1 " See, e.g., Goldman, Sachs & Co. v. Blondis, 412 F. Supp. 286 (N.D. Ill. 1976)
(holding waiver limited to specific subject of particular conversation with attorney which client
revealed at deposition); Lee Nat'l Corp. v. Deramus, 313 F. Supp. 224, 227 (D. Del. 1970)
(finding attorney-client privilege waived only with respect to particular subject matter of con-
ference between president of corporation and counsel).
'" 87 F.R.D. 358 (N.D. III. 1980).
105
 Id, at 359.
L06 Id. See also International Tel. & Tel. Corp. v. United Tel. Co. of Fla., 60 F.R.D.
177, 185-86 (M.D. Fla. 1973); see WIGMORE, supra note 2, 5 2327, at 638; MCCORMICK, supra
note 9, § 93, at 194-95.
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disclosed relates to the notion of fairness, one element of waiver. 107 Fairness re-
quires that the remainder of the subject matter or of the particular communica-
tion be disclosed, although communications on other subjects may still be priv-
ileged.' 08 A partial disclosure of subject matter or of the particular communica-
tion could result in unfairness to the recipient of the disclosure because of the
possibility of being misled by incomplete information.'" This common law ex-
ception to the traditional rule of complete waiver is therefore still consistent
with the concern for fairness which is an underlying rationale for the doctrine
of waiver."°
b. Disclosure for Negotiation Purposes
Several courts have held that a limited waiver or no waiver of the attorney-
client privilege occurs when confidential information is disclosed, normally by
the attorney, for negotiation purposes." The courts that give a narrow reading
to the scope of waiver in these circumstances have held that the waiver is
limited to that information which is disclosed during negotiations. " 2 The use of
confidential information for negotiations, therefore, does not constitute waiver
of the entire attorney-client privilege."' These courts have held that to deny
protection would destroy the attorney-client privilege whenever a party entered
into negotiations, and thus would defeat the policy of encouraging parties to
resolve their differences through negotiation. 114
Other courts, adopting a more liberal standard, have concluded that no
waiver of the attorney-client privilege occurred, even though some level of dis-
closure resulted during the parties' negotiations." 5 The basis for these deci-
sions was that no disclosure of the contents of specific communications was
made during negotiations,"° so that the statements made during negotiations
did not constitute a waiver. These courts have rejected the notion that a party
107 See WIGMORE, supra note 2, § 2327, at 636.
'° 8 Id. at 638.
"9 Teachers Ins. & Annuity Ass'n of Am. v. Shamrock Broadcasting Co., 521 F. Supp.
638, 641 (S.D.N,Y. 1981); United States v. Aronoff, 466 F, Supp. 855, 862 (S.D.N.Y. 1979); see
Lee Nat'l Corp. v. Deramus, 313 F. Supp. 224, 227 (D. Del. 1970).
"° See supra notes 92-95 and accompanying text.
"' See Sylgab Steel & Wire Corp. v. Imoco-Gateway Corp., 62 F.R.D. 454 (N.D. Ill.
1974), aff'd, 534 F.2d 330 (7th Cir. 1976); International Business Mach. Corp. v. Sperry Rand
Corp., 44 F.R.D. 10 (D. Del. 1968). But see Sicpa North Am., Inc. v. Donaldson Enterprises,
Inc., 179 N.J. Super. 56, 430 A.2d 262, 266 (1981) (disclosure or privileged report for limited
purpose of settlement negotiations waived privilege so that report discoverable).
10 See, e.g., Burlington Indus. v. Exxon Corp., 65 F.R.D. 26, 46(D. Md. 1974); Inter-
national Business Mach. Corp. v. Sperry Rand Corp., 44 F.R.D. 10, 13 (D. Del. 1968).
13 Burlington Indus. v. Exxon Corp., 65 F.R.D. at 46.
" 4 See International Business Mach. Corp. v. Sperry Rand Corp., 44 F.R.D. at 13 n.2.
115 See, e.g., Sylgab Steel & Wire Corp, v. Imoco-Gateway Corp., 62 F.R.D. 454, 457-
58 (N.D. Ill. 1974), aff'd, 534 F.2d 330 (7th Cir. 1976); American Optical Corp. v. Medtronic,
Inc., 56 F.R.D. 426, 431-32 (D. Mass. 1972).
116 Sylgab, 62 F.R.D. at 458; American Optical, 56 F.R.D. at 432.
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would waive the attorney-client privilege if the lawyer, bargaining on his
client's behalf, revealed the client's position on an issue.'" The courts further
reasoned that negotiations involved pre-trial matters, not evidence, and that
positions taken during negotiations did not have to be supported by proof." 8
The common law, therefore, has recognized that disclosures of confidential
matters may be made during negotiations which, due to the policy of favoring
negotiated settlements, will not be considered a waiver, or at most will consti-
tute a limited waiver of the attorney-client privilege.
2. Limited Waiver for Corporate Clients
In recent years, a few courts have introduced another situation in which
only a limited waiver of the attorney-client privilege has been recognized.
These courts have suggested that the scope of waiver should be limited when
disclosure of privileged information is made by a corporation to a government
agency. "9
 Under this proposed limitation, a client's waiver would be limited
soley to the government agency which received the privileged information.' 20
The client, therefore, would retain the right to assert the attorney-client privi-
lege against attempts by other parties to obtain the same information disclosed
to the agency.w Thus, this waiver is not limited in terms of subject matter or
for negotiation purposes, the circumstances of limited waiver generally recog-
nized under the common law."' Rather, the courts following this concept of
limited waiver for corporate clients have held that the waiver is limited with
respect to the recipient of the disclosed privileged information.' 23
The recipient-limited waiver, however, has not been unanimously ac-
cepted by the courts. 124
 There is currently a split among the circuit courts over
the acceptance of this new concept of limited waiver for corporate clients.'"
This section will first examine those decisions which have adopted this concept
of recipient-limited waiver, and the policy reasons used in its support. The sec-
" 7 Sylgab, 62 F.R.D. at 458 ("Clients and lawyers should not have to fear that positions
on legal issues taken during negotiations waive the attorney-client privilege so that the private
opinions and reports drafted by an attorney for his client become discoverable.") (citing American
Optical, 56 F.R.D. at 432).
'" See, e.g., American Optical, 56 F.R.D. at 432.
1 ' See Diversified Indus., Inc. v. Meredith, 572 F.2d 596 (8th Cir. 1978) (en bane);
Byrnes v. IDS Realty Trust, 85 F.R.D. 679 (S.D.N.Y. 1980); In re Grand jury Subpoena Dated
July 13, 1979, 578 F. Supp. 368 (E.D. Wis. 1979).
120 Diversified Indus., Inc. v. Meredith, 572 F.2d 596, 611 (8th Cir. 1978) (en bane);
Byrnes v. IDS Realty Trust, 85 F.R.D. 679, 689 (S.D.N.Y. 1980).
12 ' See, e.g., Diversified Indus., Inc. v. Meredith, 572 F.2d 596, 611 (8th Cir. 1978) (en
bane) (plaintiff's motion to compel production of documents previously disclosed to SEC by
defendant corporation denied).
122
 See supra notes 101.18 and accompanying text.
122 See Diversified Indus., Inc. v. Meredith, 572 F.2d 596 (8th Cir. 1978) (en bane);
Byrnes v, IDS Realty Trust, 85 F.R.D. 679 (S.D.N.Y. 1980); In re Grand Jury Subpoena Dated
July 13, 1979, 578 F. Supp. 368 (E.D. Wis. 1979).
1 " See, e.g., Permian Corp. v. United States, 665 F.2d 1214 (D.C. Cir. 1981).
125 Compare Diversified Indus., Inc. v. Meredith, 572 F.2d 596, 611 (8th Cir. 1978) (en
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lion will then present the decisions which have rejected the concept of recipient-
limited waiver for corporate clients, and their reasons for doing so.
a. Recognition of the Recipient -Limited Waiver
The concept of a waiver limited to the particular agency to which a cor-
porate client's communication was disclosed was first articulated by the United
States Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit.'" In Diversified Industries, Inc. v.
Meredith,'" the corporate defendant, Diversified Industries, had turned over to
the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC), in response to a subpoena,
certain confidential material that its attorneys had prepared in the course of an
investigation into improper payments made by the corporation.' 2 8 When a cor-
porate customer brought suit against Diversified Industries and sought to ob-
tain that same material through discovery, the corporation claimed that the
confidential material was protected by attorney-client privilege./ 29
The Eighth Circuit, sitting en banc, upheld the claim of privilege for those
corporate communications. 130 The appeals court concluded that the disclosure
of confidential information by the corporation to the SEC constituted only a
limited waiver,' 3 ' such that the information was protected against discovery by
the plaintiff.'" The circuit court reasoned that since the disclosure by Diversi-
fied Industries had occurred in a separate and nonpublic SEC investigation,
the waiver of privilege was limited to the regulatory agency's use.'" The court
also stated that it did not want to thwart the developing procedure among cor-
porations of employing outside counsel to conduct in-house investigations.' 34
Subsequently, two federal district courts relied upon the holding of Diversi-
fied to reach decisions that either a limited waiver'" or no waiver.'" had oc-
curred when a corporation released privileged information to government
banc) (recognizing recipient-limited waiver for corporate clients) with Permian Corp. v. United
States, 665 F.2d 1214 (D.C. Cir. 1981) and In re Weiss, 596 F.2d 1185 (4th Cir. 1979) (rejecting
concept of limited waiver).
125 Diversified Indus,, Inc. v. Meredith, 572 F.2d 596 (8th Cir. 1978) (en banc). See
generally Comment, The Evaluative Report Privilege, and Diversified Industries, Inc. v. Meredith, 40
OHIO ST. L. J. 699, 714-21 (1979).
127 Diversified Indus., Inc. v. Meredith, 572 F.2d 596 (8th Cir. 1978) (en bane),
'28 Diversified Indus., Inc. v. Meredith, 572 F.2d 596, 599 (8th Cir. 1977), modified, 572
F.2d 596, 606 (8th Cir. 1978) (en banc).
124
"° Diversified Indus., Inc. v. Meredith, 572 F.2d 596, 611 (8th Cir, 1978) (en banc).
131 Id,
132 Id.
1 " Id.
134 Id. But see In re Sealed Case, 676 F.2d 793, 823-24 (D.C. Cir. 1982) (limited waiver
might encourage corporations to hide documents from SEC or hope that SEC did not discover, so
they could claim privilege against other government agencies).
'" Byrnes v. IDS Realty Trust, 85 F.R.D. 679 (S.D.N.Y. 1980).
136 In re Grand Jury Subpoena Dated July 13, 1979, 478 F. Supp. 368 (E.D. Wis. 1979).
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agencies. These courts expanded the policy suggested in Diversified,'" reason-
ing that limiting the scope of waiver would encourage cooperation with govern-
ment agencies.'" Both district courts concluded that adherence to the tradi-
tional rule of waiver would discourage disclosure to government agencies by
corporations. 139 In In re Grand July Subpoena Dated July 13, 1979, 1 " the district
court relied upon Diversified to hold that release of a law firm's report to the
SEC and the Internal Revenue Service (IRS), regarding its investigation into
questionable payments and tax liabilities of the corporate client, did not waive
the attorney-client privilege with respect to notes made by the lawyers in com-
piling the report and interviewing employees."' Similarly, the district court in
Byrnes v. IDS Realty Trust,' 42 noting that the facts presented were indistinguish-
able from Diversified, held that circuit court decision to be controlling. 143 Byrnes
involved the disclosure of various documents prepared by the corporations's at-
torneys to the Securities and Exchange Commission in response to a nonpublic
investigation by that agency. I 44 The plaintiffs in Byrnes sued IDS Realty Trust
for violations of federal and state securities laws and breach of fiduciary
duty.' 45 The action came before the court on a motion by the plaintiffs to com-
pel deposition testimony and document production by the law firm and several
individual attorneys who had been counsel to IDS Realty Trust. 146 The de-
fendant's attorneys argued that the limited disclosure made to the SEC did not
constitute a waiver of attorney-client privilege."' The Byrnes court ruled that
the plaintiff could not obtain the corporate defendant's report because the
attorney-client privilege protecting it had not been waived, despite the disclo-
sure of the report to SEC.'" According to the court, voluntary submissions to
agencies in separate, private proceedings should be a waiver only as to those
proceedings.'"
" 7 See supra text accompanying note 134.
1 " See Byrnes v. IDS Realty Trust, 85 F.R.D. 679, 688 (S.D.N.Y. 1980); In re Grand
Jury Subpoena Dated July 13, 1979, 478 F. Supp. 368, 372-73 (E.D. Wis. 1979).
"9 See, e.g., In re Grand Jury Subpoena, 478 F. Supp. at 372-73.
' 4° Id.
"j Id.
142 85 F.R.D. 679 (S.D.N.Y. 1980).
'" Id. at 685.
14 Id. at 681-83. The documents consisted of (1) those generated by corporate counsel
or received from the corporate client to enable the counsel to give legal advice; (2) tables,
analyses and reports based on factual data prepared by the client corporation, on which counsel
placed notes in connection with furnishing legal advice; (3) those received after litigation was
threatened or commenced which enabled counsel to prepare for litigation, withheld under the
work product doctrine; and (4) those previously withheld by the magistrate during earlier dis-
covery proceedings. Id. at 682-83.
149 Id. at 681.
116 Id. at 680-81.
147
 Id. at 682.
144 Id. at 689.
149 Id.
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b. Rejection of the Recipient-Limited Waiver for Corporate Clients
Since the decision in Diversified, two circuit courts have expressly rejected
the concept of a recipient-limited waiver for corporate clients.'" The first court
to do so was the United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia
Circuit in Permian Corp, v. United States." Permian involved the disclosure of
documents to the Securities and Exchange Commission, in cooperation with an
informal investigation by the SEC into Permian's proposal for an exchange of-
fer. 152
 When the United States Department of Energy sought those same docu-
ments in connection with an investigation of petroleum pricing, Permian
asserted an attorney-client privilege.'" The appeals court held that the corpo-
ration's privilege had been waived by its voluntary disclosure to the SEC.'"
Moreover, although the facts in Permian were similar to those in Diversified, the
circuit court stated that it found the limited waiver theory from that case
"wholly unpersuasive." "55
The circuit court in Permian presented three reasons for rejecting the
recipient-limited waiver theory announced in Diversified. First, the Permian
court stated that the limited waiver rule of Diversified had very little to do with
the interest behind the attorney-client privilege in promoting the confidential
relationship between the attorney and client.'" The Permian court rejected the
policy reasoning in Diversified, stating that while voluntary cooperation with
government investigations may be a laudable activity, it is irrelevant to the
attorney-client relationship.'" Second, the appeals court stated that the
attorney-client privilege was not designed for tactical employment,' 58 The
court did not want the use of a limited waiver to permit selective disclosure,
whereby a client might pick and choose among its opponents.' 58 Finally, the
15° Permian Corp. v. United States, 665 F.2d 1214 (D.C. Cir. 1981); In re Weiss, 596
F.2d 1185 (4th Cir. 1979).
1 " 665 F.2d 1214 (D.C. Cir. 1981). See also Maryville Academy v. Loeb Rhodes & Co.,
Inc., 559 F. Supp. 7, 8 (N.D. Ill. 1982) (following holding in Permian that voluntary disclosure of
privileged documents and testimony to SEC was complete waiver of attorney-client privilege).
"2
 Permian Corp. v. United States, 665 F.2d 1214, 1216 (D.C. Cir. 1982).
155 See id, at 1217.
154 Id. at 1222.
I" Id. at 1220.
156 Id. at 1220-21
157 hi.
1 " Id. at 1221.
159 Id. See also In re John Doe Corp., 675 F.2d 482 (2d Cir. 1982), in which the Second
Circuit found that a corporation was not entitled to a claim of attorney-client privilege after it had
shown a report on internal business ethics, prepared by its legal department, to outsiders. In re
John Doc Corp., 675 F.2d at 485. The appeals court's decision did not expressly mention the
term limited waiver, although the court referred to Permian as an analogous case. Id. at 489. The
court stated that it agreed with the holding in Permian rejecting a "pick and choose" theory of
attorney-client privilege. Id. There were additional reasons, however, for the circuit court to find
that waiver had occurred in John Doe Corp. The court stated that there was probable cause to be-
lieve that the corporation had used the report in furtherance of ongoing criminality. Id. at 488. In
addition, the court held that the disclosure of the report to outsiders either waived the privilege,
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court in Permian held that there was no public policy requiring the traditional
doctrine of waiver to be overriden.' 6° If public policy should demand coopera-
tion with government agencies, the court reasoned, the corporation could not
withhold from the Department of Energy privileged information which it had
already voluntarily disclosed to the SEC.' 6 ' The court stated that it could not
rationalize placing a higher value on cooperation with the SEC than with other
regulatory agencies, including the Department of Energy. 162 Thus, the court
concluded that Permian had waived the attorney-client privilege completely
when it disclosed confidential documents to the SEC."'
Another circuit court also refused to follow the decision in Diversified to
limit a corporate client's waiver of its attorney-client privilege to a particular
government agency. 164 That court, however, based its decision on narrow
grounds. In In re Weiss, 165 the attorney for a corporation had testified before the
SEC in a private investigative proceeding, and the corporation had waived its
attorney-client privilege with regard to that testimony.'" When the attorney
attempted to assert the privilege in a subsequent grand jury proceeding, the
United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit denied the claim, stating
that it found no compelling reason to interfere with the grand jury proceed-
ing.' 67 The appeals court refused to find Diversified controlling, since that
earlier case had involved a request for discovery in a private litigation, and had
not required judicial intervention into the grand jury process.'"
Finally, one district court has suggested a modified approach to the abso-
lute rule of waiver when a corporate client releases privileged information to
the SEC. In Teachers Insurance Annuity Association of America v. Shamrock Broadcast-
ing Co., Inc., 169 the defendant corporation sought to compel production of docu-
ments which the plaintiff association had turned over to the SEC in response to
a subpoena.' 70 The plaintiff association had brought the action to recover dam-
ages for the defendant's failure to honor stock warrants at the agreed upon ex-
ercise price. 17 ' The defendant raised an affirmative defense regarding trans-
actions between principals and directors of the defendant corporation and the
plaintiff, which had been the subject of an SEC investigation.'" At issue was
or evidenced a corporate decision to use the report for purposes other than seeking legal advice,
which would remove the privilege. Id.
16° 665 F.2d at 1221.
'' Id.
163 Id.
163 Id. at 1222.
164 In re Weiss, 596, F.2d 1185 (4th Cir. 1979).
"5 Id.
1" Id. at 1186.
167 Id.
168 Id.
' 69 521 F. Supp. 638 (S.D.N.Y. 1981).
1' Id. at 639.
171 m
12 Id. at 639-40.
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whether the plaintiff had waived the right to assert the attorney-client privilege
by virtue of the disclosure of the documents to the SEC.'" The district court
held that the disclosure to the SEC would be deemed a complete waiver of the
privilege, unless the right to assert the privilege was specifically reserved at the
time disclosure was made. "4
 The court ruled that no waiver would occur if the
documents were given to the SEC under a protective order, stipulation, or
other express reservation of the disclosing party's claim to its attorney-client
privilege. 175
The district court in Teachers Insurance presented a three part rationale in
support of its modified approach. First, the court stated that an express reser-
vation of privilege would not be difficult to assert."' Second, a reservation
would not substantially curtail the investigative ability of the SEC, since
stipulations or protective orders had been used previously by the SEC, and
SEC regulations already provided for designation of documents as confidential
under the Freedom of Information Act.'" Third, an express reservation would
make it clear that the disclosing party had made some effort to comply with the
requirement of maintaining confidentiality for the attorney-client privilege."B
When the modified approach was applied to the facts in Teachers Insurance, the
court was unable to rule as a matter of law that the plaintiff association had not
waived its attorney-client privilege. 179
 Instead, the district court arranged for a
further hearing on the specific issues of whether the documents to the SEC
were in fact privileged, and whether the association had turned them over with-
out making any express claims of confidentiality or attorney-client privilege.'"
In summary, the Eighth Circuit introduced the concept of a limited waiver
for corporate clients in Diversified Industries, Inc. v. Meredith. The policy behind
the decision in Diversified — to encourage cooperation with government agen-
cies by corporations — was adopted by two district courts. In contrast, how-
ever, two circuit courts have rejected the use of a limited waiver for corporate
clients when they have disclosed privileged information. These courts have
relied upon the traditional rule of waiver, holding that any disclosure by a cor-
poration constituted a complete waiver of the attorney-client privilege. They
have refused to adopt a rule which would allow for selective disclosures by a
corporation to a government agency. The district court in Teachers Insurance,'"
however, suggested a modification of that viewpoint, holding that disclosure to
the SEC would constitute a complete waiver unless the corporation made an
express reservation of the attorney-client privilege at the time of disclosure.
'" Id. at 639.
174 Id. at 644-45.
'" Id. at 646.
176 Id.
177
178 Id.
'"
180 id.
181
 521 F. Supp. 638 (S.D.N.Y. 1981).
1302	 BOSTON COLLEGE LAW REVIEW	 [Vol. 24:1283
III. CRITICISM OF THE RECIPIENT-LIMITED WAIVER CONCEPT
While any disclosure of privileged communications traditionally consti-
tutes a complete waiver of the attorney-client privilege, courts generally recog-
nize that the scope of the waiver may be limited in three circumstances. First,
when the subject matter of a confidential communication is disclosed, the
waiver will be limited to that subject matter. 182 Second, when partial disclosure
of a privileged communication is made, the waiver will be limited to the extent
of revealing the remainder of the communication on that subject matter.'"
Third, when privileged information is used for negotiation purposes, the courts
have held that either waiver is limited to that information,'" or that no waiver
has occurred. 185 A fourth limitation on waiver — introduced by the Eighth Cir-
cuit in Diversified Industries, Inc. v. Meredith' 86 — has not garnered unanimous
support.'" This fourth limitation, a recipient-limited waiver, restricts waiver
of the attorney-client privilege in the context of corporate clients who disclose
privileged information to government agencies.'" This section begins with a
criticism of the decision in Diversified regarding limited waiver. 189 The section
then presents three major reasons for not adopting the concept of recipient-
limited waiver.'" The analysis in this section demonstrates that there are insuf-
ficient policy reasons for adopting such a rule, that it is in conflict with the prin-
ciple of fairness underlying the doctrine of waiver, and that such a concept of
limited waiver does nothing to promote the confidential relationship between
attorney and client. Finally, this section considers the modified approach, pro-
viding for a reservation of privilege at the time of disclosure, and concludes
that, for similar reasons, it also should not be adopted.' 9 '
The decision of the Diversified court regarding recipient-limited waiver can
be sharply criticized for several reasons. First, the appeals court, although in-
troducing a new context for limited waiver of the attorney-client privilege, gave
only cursory treatment to the topic. The discussion of limited waiver was con-
fined to one paragraph at the end of the opinion.'" The court failed to define
what it meant by "limited waiver," 193 and did not explain in what way the
waiver was being limited — whether in terms of the material already disclosed
to the SEC, or in terms of to whom it had been disclosed. Since the circuit court
182 See supra notes 101-03 and accompanying text.
183 See supra notes 104-06 and accompanying text.
'" See, e.g., Burlington Indus. v. Exxon Corp., 65 F.R.D. 26, 46 (D. Md. 1974).
1 " See, e.g., Sylgab Steel & Wire Corp. v. Imoco-Gateway Corp., 62 F.R.D. 454,
457-58 (N.D. Ill. 1974), aff'd, 534 F.2d 330 (7th Cir. 1976).
"8 572 F.2d 596 (8th Cir. 1978) (en Lam).
1 " See, e.g., Permian Corp. v. United States, 665 F.2d 1214 (D.C. Cir. 1981).
188 See Diversified Indus., Inc. v. Meredith, 572 F.2d 596, 611 (8th Cir. 1978) (en bane).
189 See infra notes 192-210 and accompanying text.
190 See infra notes 211-40 and accompanying text.
2 " See infra notes 241-49 and accompanying text.
'" Diversified Indus., Inc. v. Meredith, 572 F.2d 596, 611 (8th Cir. 1978) (en bane).
193 Id.
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ruled against discovery of the material by a third party, the opinion presuma-
bly means that the waiver was limited solely to the SEC, since the SEC already
had received the privileged information. 194 It is not clear from the court's deci-
sion, however, whether the corporation would be allowed to assert the
attorney-client privilege in response to any further demands for confidential in-
formation by the SEC.
In addition, the cursory treatment of the concept of limited waiver by the
Diversified court provides little guidance for other courts wishing to follow that
holding. The court failed to explain adequately the reasoning behind its finding
of a limited waiver. The opinion made reference to the fact that the disclosure
occurred in a separate and nonpublic SEC proceeding.' 95 The appeals court
also cited two cases in support of its holding, both of which found that no
waiver had occurred when disclosures had been made in separate proceed-
ings. 196 Those cases, however, cannot be considered adequate precedent for the
decision in Diversified. The first case, Bucks County Bank & Trust Co. v. Storck,' 97
came before a federal district court on a motion to compel the defendant's at-
torney to answer questions at a deposition.'" The court found that those ques-
tions sought to elicit privileged communications between the attorney and his
client.'" The defendant client, however, previously had testified before the
court on a motion seeking the return of property taken from him by an alleged
illegal search and seizure. 20° The court held that the client's testimony had
been given solely for the purpose of that motion, and thus did not constitute a
general waiver of the attorney-client privilege. 201
The second case referred to by the Diversified court was United States v.
Goodman, 202 in which the court held that waiver must occur in the same pro-
ceeding in which it is sought. 203 Goodman, however, involved waiver of the con-
stitutional right against self-incrimination, not waiver of the attorney-client
privilege. 204 In addition, the Goodman court, in reaching its decision, relied
solely upon cases involving the fifth amendment privilege against self-
incrimination . 2 ° 5
The Diversified court's reliance upon the nonpublic nature of the SEC in-
vestigation also is not warranted, for two reasons. First, since the purpose of
' 94 Id.
195 Id.
96 Id. (citing Bucks County Bank & Trust Co. v. Storck, 297 F. Supp. 1122 (D. Hawaii
1969); United States v. Goodman, 289 F.2d 256 (4th Cir.), vacated on other grounds, 368 U.S. 14
(1961)).
197 297 F. Supp. 1122 (D. Hawaii 1969).
198 Id. at 1123.
'" Id.
zoo
201 Id.
202 289 F.2d 256 (4th Cir.), vacated on other grounds, 368 U.S. 14 (1961).
203
	 at 259.
204 Id.
205 Id.
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the attorney-client privilege is to protect confidentiality, 209 any disclosure of
privileged information to a third person breaches the confidentiality of the com-
munications between attorney and client, and thus destroys the purpose of the
privilege. 207 There is no provision under the common law for privilege to be
maintained if disclosure is made to a third party who then promises to keep the
information confidentia1. 208 Thus, the confidentiality of the attorney-corporate
client communications has still been breached by virtue of the disclosure to the
SEC, even if the SEC does not plan on making the information public. Second,
while the court labelled the SEC proceeding nonpublic, the privileged informa-
tion disclosed to the SEC therein could be made public if the SEC determined
that its investigative proceeding should result in litigation. 209
 Additionally,
there is the possibility that the privileged information about the corporation
could be obtained by another party from the SEC under the Freedom of Infor-
mation Act. 21 °
Besides these specific criticisms of the decision in Diversified, three major
reasons exist for not permitting the use of a recipient-limited waiver by corpo-
rate clients. First, the policy rationales, employed as the primary grounds by
the courts to support their grant of the recipient-limited waiver in the corporate
context, are wholly inadequate. The Diversified court indicated that its decision
was based upon a policy of not discouraging corporations from employing
counsel to conduct independent investigations into possible corporate mis-
deeds. 211 Subsequently, the two district courts which relied upon Diversified ex-
tended that reasoning to a broad policy of encouraging cooperation with
government agencies. 212 While that policy of cooperation may be commend-
able, the courts relying upon it have failed to demonstrate how it justifies in-
troducing a new context for a limited waiver of the attorney-client privilege
based upon the disclosure's recipient. Those courts have not substantiated
their claim with any evidence that a complete waiver of privilege would
discourage any cooperation by corporations with government agencies. In fact,
2°5 WIGMORE, supra note 2, 2285, at 527; Id. $ 2311 at 599.
207 See, e.g., In re Grand Jury Investig. of Ocean Transp., 604 F.2d 672, 675 (D.C. Cir.
1979); In re Penn Central Commercial Paper Litig., 61 F.R.D. 453, 464 (S.D.N.Y. 1973).
208 WIGMORE, supra note 2, $ 2286, at 528.
209 See, e.g., Diversified Indus., Inc. v. Meredith, 572 F.2d 596, 600 (8th Cir. 1977)
(SEC investigated slush fund maintained by Diversified and later filed suit for an injunction
against Diversified).
215 5 U.S.C. $ 552 (1974). See generally, A.B. LEVENSON & H.L. Pin', GOVERNMENT
INFORMATION — FREEDOM OF INFORMATION ACT, SUNSHINE ACT, PRIVACY ACT (1978). It
should be noted, however, that amendments to the Freedom of Information Act passed under the
Privacy Act of 1974, 5 U.S.C. $ 552a (1974), permit the SEC to exempt records from forced
disclosure. 5 U.S.C. 552a(j). The SEC has promulgated regulations providing a procedure
whereby perscins submitting information to the Commission can request confidential treatment
under the Freedom of Information Act. 17 C.F.R. $ 200.83.
211 572 
. F.2d at 611 (8th Cir. 1978) (en bane).
212 See Byrnes v. IDS Realty Trust, 85 F.R.D. 679, 688 (S.D.N.Y. 1980); In re Grand
Jury Subpoena Dated July 13, 1979, 478 F. Supp. 368, 372-73 (E.D. Wis. 1979).
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corporations frequently cooperate with government agencies because it serves
their own purposes. For example, in Permian Corp. v. United States, 213 the cor-
poration willingly allowed the SEC to obtain privileged material in the hopes
that it would speed up SEC approval of its exchange offer. 214
Furthermore, the Permian court was correct in observing that a policy of
encouraging cooperation with certain government agencies has not been man-
dated by congressional directive nor been widely recognized by the courts. 2 ' 5
By contrast, however, the limited waiver exception granted for negotiation
purposes is based upon a well-recognized policy of the judicial system to en-
courage settlement and avoid litigation. 216 Adopting a policy of encouraging
cooperation with government agencies as the basis for granting a limited
waiver would also lead to a wide application of the recipient-limited waiver
rule, in view of the large number of government agencies.'" Moreover, adopt-
ing such a policy could lead to a confused application of the recipient-limited
waiver rule, as in Permian, where the corporation was willing to cooperate with
one government agency by releasing privileged information, but sought to in-
voke the attorney-client privilege to protect against discovery by another
government agency. As the Permian court stated, there is no priority system
which places a higher value upon cooperation with one agency over another. 218
The policy reasoning of the Diversified court's holding, therefore, is an inade-
quate basis for adopting a rule which would allow for limited waiver by cor-
porate clients who make disclosures of privileged information to government
agencies.
Second, the concept of a recipient-limited waiver for corporate clients
should be rejected because it is in conflict with an underlying principle of the
doctrine of waiver:219 The concept of a limited waiver for corporate clients vio-
lates the element of fairness in the doctrine of waiver. 228 The traditional rule for
waiver is based upon a notion of fairness in the adversarial system, so that once
a disclosure of privileged information is made, the opposing party should have
the right to obtain the remainder of the privileged communications in order not
to be unfairly misled by incomplete information."' Similarly, the traditionally
213 665 F.2d 1214 (D.C. Cir. 1981).
214 Id. at 1216.
215
	
at 1221. Nevertheless, courts frequently do base their decisions on public policy
reasons. Cf. Byrnes v. IDS Realty Trust, 85 F.R.D. 679, 688 (S.D.N.Y. 1980); In re Grand Jury
Subpoena Dated July 13, 1979, 478 F. Supp. 368, 372-73 (E.D. Wis. 1979).
216
	
International Business Mach. Corp. v. Sperry Rand Corp., 44 F.R.D. 10, 13 n.2.
2 " The number of federal administrative authorities probably exceeds one thousand.
S.G. BREYER & R.B. STEWART, ADMINISTRATIVE LAW AND REGULATORY POLICY 6-7 (1979).
Federal administrative authorities include the thirteen Cabinet departments, federal agencies
within the departments, such as the Internal Revenue Service in the Department of Treasury,
administrative agencies outside the departments such as the Environmental Protection Agency,
and independent regulatory commissions, such as the Securities and Exchange Commission. Id.
7" Permian Corp. v. United States, 665 F.2d 1214, 1221 (D.C. Cir. 1981).
2" See supra notes 92-95 and accompanying text.
220 See WIGMORE, supra note 2, 5 2327, at 636.
221 United States v. Aronoff, 466 F. Supp. 855, 862 (S.D.N.Y. 1979).
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accepted common law rules allowing for a limited waiver of privilege in certain
circumstances222 are also based upon a notion of fairness. 223 Once disclosure of
subject matter or partial disclosure of a privileged communication is made,
fairness demands that the entire subject or the entire communication on that
subject be revealed, although the waiver is limited to that extent. 224
Since fairness is an important element in the doctrine of waiver, it can be
argued that the standard of fairness should apply not only in terms of the scope
of the information disclosed, but should also include fairness in the treatment
of the parties involved in the disclosure of privileged information. The concept
of recipient-limited waiver as used in Diversified cannot meet this standard of
fairness because it discriminates against both who may use the limited waiver
and to whom it can apply. First, limited waiver in this context has been granted
so far exclusively to corporate clients. The courts favoring the recipient-limited
waiver rule have promoted it as a means of encouraging corporate cooperation
with government agencies. 225 Those courts have not made any suggestion that
the recipient-limited waiver would apply to individual clients who might make
disclosures of privileged information to government agencies, such as the Inter-
nal Revenue Service. 226 Yet all other rules regarding the attorney-client
privilege and the doctrine of waiver apply with equal force to individual and
corporate clients. 227 Fairness, an essential element in the doctrine of waiver, 228
would seem to dictate that any new context for limited waiver be available to all
clients seeking protection under the attorney-client privilege.
Second, and more significantly, this new rule for recipient-limited waiver
is unfair in the way in which waiver would be limited. Under the contexts for
limited waiver already recognized by the common law, the limit upon waiver
turns upon the extent to which the information has lost its claim of privilege. 229
Thus, anyone would be able to obtain those particular attorney-client com-
munications for which privilege had been waived. Communications which
were not affected by the limited disclosure would still be protected by privilege,
2" Waiver of the attorney-client privilege may be limited to subject matter of the confi-
dential communication when that subject matter is revealed, when a partial disclosure is made,
or when disclosure is made for negotiation purposes. See supra notes 101-06 and notes 111-18 and
accompanying text.
2" See WIGMORE, supra note 2, § 2327, at 636.
224 See supra notes 101-10 and accompanying text.
2 " See supra notes 137-39 and accompanying text.
2 " An individual taxpayer, in the course of reporting his income to the Internal Reve-
nue Service, cannot disclose privileged attorney-client communications, and still protect that in-
formation from further discovery by third parties by claiming the attorney-client privilege. See,
e.g., United States v. Cote, 456 F.2c1 142, 145 (8th Cir. 1972) (court enforced IRS summonses
against attorney and accountant where disclosure of individual clients' confidential information
on amended tax returns effectively waived attorney-client privilege); United States v. Mierz-
wicki, 500 F. Supp. 1331, 1334-35 (D. Md. 1980).
227 See Upjohn Co. v. United States, 449 U.S. 383, 390 (1981); Radiant Burners, Inc. v.
American Gas Ass'n, 320 F.2d 314, 323 (7th Cir. 1963).
"a
 WIGMORE, supra note 2, § 2327, at 636.
2" See, e.g., Weil v. Investment/Indicators, Research & Management, 647 F.2d 18, 25
(9th Cir. 1981); Lee Nat'l Corp. v. Deramus, 313 F. Supp. 224, 227 (D. Del. 1970).
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since their confidentiality was not breached. In contrast, the rule for limited
waiver from Diversified would shift the meaning of the extent of waiver. Instead
of waiver being limited in terms of what information was disclosed, waiver
would be limited in terms of who received the privileged information. The new
context for limited waiver would allow a corporate client to waive privilege only
in regard to the government agency that received the privileged information,
yet in all other respects, the attorney-client privilege would remain intact for
that information. 230 In this sense, the holding in Diversified actually involves a
selective waiver, not a limited waiver. The recipient-limited waiver rule, if
adopted, would permit a corporation to select to whom the waiver of privilege
would apply, or in which proceedings, while allowing the corporation to con-
tinue to assert the privilege against other parties. The court in Permian was cor-
rect in stating that the attorney-client privilege was not designed for tactical
employment, so that the client cannot be permitted to pick and choose among
his opponents, waiving his privilege for some and invoking it against others."'
Such a concept of limited waiver violates the maxim that the attorney-client
privilege may be used as a shield, but may not be converted into a sword."'
Since the rationale for the doctrine of waiver is focused upon fairness in the
adversarial ,system, 2 " a rule which would permit a corporate client to use
limited waiver offensively against certain opposing parties"' is inconsistent
with the element of fairness.
Third, the concept of recipient-limited waiver from Diversified is inconsist-
ent with the principles of the attorney-client privilege. The purpose of the
privilege is to promote full and frank communication between the attorney and
client, through the assurance of confidentiality."' As with all the common law
privileges, the emphasis is on the relationship between the parties who are pro-
tected by the privilege. The Permian court correctly observed that the limited
waiver rule articulated in Diversified has little to do with the confidential rela-
tionship between the attorney and client. 236 By comparison, the other circum-
stances for limited waiver under the common law do operate in the interest of
the attorney-client relationship. For example, when a limited waiver is granted
for negotiation purposes, the attorney-client relationship is still being promoted
"° See, e.g., Diversified Indus., Inc. v. Meredith, 572 F.2d 596 (8th Cir. 1978) (en
banc).
"' Permian Corp. v. United States, 665 F.2d 1214, 1221 (D.C. Cir. 1981).
"2 Byrnes v. IDS Realty Trust, 85 F.R.D. 679, 688-89 (S.D.N.Y. 1980); see Teachers
Ins. & Annuity Ass'n of Am. v. Shamrock Broadcasting Co., 521 F. Supp. 638, 641 (S.D.N.Y.
1981); WIGMORE, supra note 2, § 2327, at 638.
"3 Handgards, Inc. v. Johnson & Johnson, 413 F. Supp. 926, 929 (N.D. Cal. 1976);
Lee Nat'l Corp. v. Deramus, 313 F. Supp. 224, 227 (D. Del. 1970); WIGMORE, supra note 2,
§ 2327, at 636.
"4 E.g., Diversified Indus., Inc. v. Meredith, 572 F.2d 596 (8th Cir. 1978) (en banc)
(use of limited waiver permitted corporate defendant to withhold certain material from plaintiff
that had been turned over to SEC).
233 Upjohn Co. v. United States, 449 U.S. 383, 389 (1981).
236 Permian Corp. v. United States, 665 F.2d 1214, 1220-21 (D.C. Cir. 1981).
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because the attorney is using the privileged information to argue on behalf of
his client. 237
 The attorney is thus fulfilling one function of his role within the
attorney-client relationship. 238
 Similarly, a limited waiver based on subject
matter or partial disclosure, whereby the confidentiality of other communica-
tions between the attorney and client is still protected, continues to preserve the
attorney-client relationship."' Under the concept of recipient-limited waiver
from Diversified, however, a corporation could disclose an entire attorney-
corporate client communication to the SEC or other government agency, and
still be granted a limited waiver. 240
 There seems little purpose, therefore, in
establishing a confidential attorney-client relationship. While granting the
limited waiver in those circumstances may not harm the attorney-client rela-
tionship, it does nothing to preserve or improve it.
Finally, the modified approach to limited waiver for corporate clients, sug-
gested by the district court in Teachers Insurance, 241 is not an appropriate rule to
adopt. The proposal of that court was that a disclosure to the SEC would not
constitute a complete waiver of attorney-client privilege if the right to assert
privilege in subsequent proceedings was specifically reserved at the time of
disclosure. 242 The court undoubtedly was correct in stating that such a reserva-
tion of privilege would not be difficult to assert. 243
 Nevertheless, the modified
approach should be rejected for the same reasons as the broad concept of
recipient-limited waiver from Diversified. The provision for a reservation of
privilege when disclosure is made to the SEC appears to be grounded still upon
a policy of encouraging cooperation with investigations conducted by govern-
ment agencies. 244 The Teachers Insurance court noted that such a reservation
would not curtail the investigative ability of the SEC. 245 The policy of encour-
aging cooperation with government agencies has already been rejected as an
insufficient reason for adopting another context of limited waiver. 246 While
Teachers Insurance involved disclosures to the SEC, presumably the reservation
could apply to any government agency which was able to preserve confidential-
ity by stipulation or protective order. 247
 Indeed, an agreement to reserve privi-
lege could be made by a disclosing party with anyone to whom he desired to
limit waiver. Such a provision for reserving privilege when disclosure is made
"' See, e.g., Sylgab Steel & Wire Corp. v. Imoco-Gateway Corp., 62 F.R.D. 454, 458
(N.D. Ill. 1974), aff'd, 534 F.2d 330 (7th Cir. 1976).
238 See, e.g., MODEL CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY Canon 7 (1979).
239 See, e.g., Goldman, Sachs & Co. v. Blondis, 412 F. Supp. 286 (N.D. Ill. 1976).
24° Diversified Indus., Inc. v. Meredith, 572 F.2d 596 (8th Cir. 1978) (en banc).
2" 521 F. Supp. 638 (S.D.N.Y. 1981); see supra notes 169-78 and accompanying text.
242
 521 F. Supp. at 644-45.
245
	 at 646,
244 See supra notes 137-39 and accompanying text.
2" 521 F. Supp. at 646.
245
	 supra notes 211-18 and accompanying text.
2" See Teachers Ins. & Annuity Ass'n of Am. v, Shamrock Broadcasting Co., 521 F.
Supp. 638, 646 (S.D.N.Y. 1981).
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violates the element of fairness in the doctrine of waiver. It would still permit
selective waiver, so that a party could choose in which proceedings, or to whom
to disclose privileged information, yet prevent others from obtaining that same
information. While the reservation of privilege does demonstrate an effort by
the disclosing party to protect confidentiality, nevertheless, that confidentiality
has been breached by the disclosure. The purpose of the attorney-client
privilege, therefore, is no longer served, 2 'e and the reservation of privilege does
nothing to promote the attorney-client relationship. 2 "9 Since the modified ap-
proach providing for a reservation of privilege at the time of disclosure is incon-
sistent with the principles of the attorney-client privilege and waiver, it, too,
should be rejected.
CONCLUSION
The circumstances under which the common law grants a limited waiver
of the attorney-client privilege should not be extended to include a provision for
limiting waiver by corporate clients making disclosures to government agen-
cies. While the circuit courts currently are split on this issue, it seems likely that
most courts will refuse to follow the decision of the Eighth Circuit in adopting a
limited waiver. Only two district courts so far have been persuaded to follow
that view, while two circuit courts have rejected such a concept of limited
waiver. Furthermore, any context for limited waiver of the attorney-client
privilege, other than those already generally recognized under the common
law, should be rejected, unless it can meet several requirements. First, there
should be strong policy reasons for adopting another form of liMited waiver.
Next, any rule of limited waiver which is adopted should be consistent with the
element of fairness in the doctrine of waiver. Finally, that concept of limited
waiver should serve the purpose of the attorney-client privilege — to protect
and promote the confidential relationship between the attorney and client.
Since the recipient-limited waiver articulated in Diversified satisfies none of
these three basic requirements for a rule of limited waiver, courts should reject
its application.
NANCY MAYER HUGHES
"" See supra notes 37-38 and accompanying text.
299 See supra notes 236-40 and accompanying text.
